This article has been updated since publication to include a statement from Johnson City ISD.
Johnson City Independent School District is accused of refusing to return property that was gifted to it in 1927, so long as it was used for school purposes. The school left almost 75 years ago but the family’s attempts to recover the property are still being fought.
Multiple rulings in the dispute have gone against the family, fueling concerns that courts are increasingly siding with government entities in land disputes.
The battle has been ongoing since 2013, but the sudden removal of a historic barbecue house has brought forward another claim that a reverter clause has been triggered.
Background
In 1927, Trent Lindig’s great-grandfather, Albert Lindig, executed a deed that conditionally transferred an acre and a half of property to the Blanco County Board of School Trustees “to be used for School purposes for the Pleasant Hill School District No. 21.”
A school operated on the property from 1927 to 1952, when the district ceased to exist and was consolidated with Johnson City ISD.
That same year, the Blanco County Board of School Trustees executed a deed transferring the property to the Pleasant Hill Improvement Association, which was later succeeded by the Pleasant Hill Rocky Community Club for use as a community center.
The 1952 Deed provided that “if the above described premises shall cease to be used for public and community purposes for a period of six (6) consecutive months, then this conveyance shall be null and void and the ownership of said premises shall revert to the Blanco County Board of School Trustees or their successors in office.”
“This conveyance is made subject to the reversionary interest of Albert Lindig, his heirs or assigns, as set forth in his Deed to the Blanco County School Trustees dated September 10, 1927,” the deed continued.
To date, the Lindigs have reportedly maintained the property, signed easements and legal documents, and paid taxes, including federal inheritance taxes on the real property and improvements.
Although the property was not being used for “school purposes,” the Lindig family allowed the club to use the land without dispute until 2012, when Lindig received an offer to rent the property. Instead of giving the property back to the Lindig family, the club chose to fight.
Initial Litigation
Lindig, represented by attorney Zachary P. Hudler, filed a lawsuit against the club in 2013, arguing that it was interfering with his right to possess the property, as conferred by the 1927 deed’s reverter clause.
As the clause reads, “[I]n case the said School House or any other house which may be built and used for a School house is removed from said land herein described then the said above described land shall revert back to me, my heirs, assigns or legal representatives.”
The club asserted that for the reverter clause to be triggered, the physical schoolhouse building must be removed from the property, not merely the school as an entity.
Hudler cited a 1913 legal precedent set by the Court of Civil Appeals of Galveston in Stewart v. Blain. The case similarly concerned a family conveying an acre of land to the government for use as a schoolhouse. The deed included a reverter clause “in event of the removal of the schoolhouse therefrom.”
Because the land was no longer being used for school purposes, the court ruled that the reverter clause had been triggered. According to the opinion, “The building may be there yet, but it is not a schoolhouse.”
In Lindig’s case, the trial court came to a different conclusion.
Judge Allan Garrett of the 33rd District Court determined that “although the conveyance for school purposes is set forth generally in the deed, the reverter clause does not terminate the grantees’ ownership of the property if it ceases being used for school purposes. Rather, the reverter clause expressly states that it is triggered only if a school house is removed from the land.”
On appeal in 2015, the Third Court of Appeals in Austin affirmed this reasoning, adding that it was “undisputed that the building once used as a school remains on the property.”
Lindig then amended his claims, asserting that although the original school house building remains, the removal of two outhouses should be enough to trigger the reverter clause, as they were used by both employees and students of the school.
He also argued that the 1952 deed is void, as public property cannot be transferred to private entities under the Texas Constitution.
The club asserted that because the trial court ruled the reverter clause wasn’t triggered, Lindig has no possessory interest in the property, and therefore no standing to challenge the 1952 deed.
Judge Garrett dismissed all of Lindig’s claims, so he once again appealed to the Third Court in Austin. In 2018, the Third Court decided that the removal of outhouses was not enough to trigger the reverter clause.
Barbecue House Demolition
In October 2025, the club removed the property’s historic barbecue house without the permission or consent of Lindig. He claims this demolition triggered the reverter clause, as the barbecue house was “built and used for a School house.”
In February, Lindig took possession and control of the property, blocking it with a propane tank, locking it up, and posting a no trespass warning, stating that the reverter clause had been triggered.
The Pleasant Hill Rocky Community Club filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enforce the previous lawsuit’s judgment, claiming Lindig was disobeying the order.
A hearing was held on March 6 before Judge Garrett. Hudler argued, in part, that Lindig’s actions were on the basis of a new claim that the reverter clause had been triggered and was therefore unrelated to the previous lawsuit, meaning the court did not have jurisdiction.
There was also an argument over whether the barbecue house was on the property and used as a school house, as the club brought in a historian who claimed it did not look old.
Photo of the property’s barbecue house before destruction.
In 1958, a 100-year history was written on the Pleasant Hill area. The document provides evidence of the school’s yearly “barbecue and homecoming” event that began on the property in 1949.
Nonetheless, Judge Garrett granted the TRO, forcing Lindig to give possession of the property to the club.
A New Lawsuit
On March 4, Lindig filed a new lawsuit, this time against Johnson City ISD, which Hudler believes to be the proper party because it is in the deed, as opposed to the club. The case falls before Judge Evan Stubbs of the 424th District Court.
The lawsuit presents four distinct claims in an effort to have the property returned.
According to the appeals courts’ reasoning that the reverter clause requires not the removal of school activities but the removal of a physical building used for a schoolhouse, Lindig contends the removal of the barbecue house—which was a “house” used as a schoolhouse—triggered the clause.
Second, Lindig cites the removal of a men’s outhouse in September 2025 under the same argument.
He further argues that the 1952 deed transferring the property from the school district to the club is null and void as a result of “multiple periods of time when the subject premises ‘cease[d] to be used for public and community purposes for a period of six (6) consecutive months.’”
James Sultemeier, former Pleasant Hill Rocky Community Club president and current member, told Texas Scorecard that the property is currently used for quarterly club meetings and a summer event. A youth deer hunting club stays on the property two weekends each year, and a local 4-H club holds about six meetings there per year.
Finally, Lindig maintains that the school district had no right to transfer the property in 1952 under the Texas Constitution. This is the first time the claim will be litigated.
He is asking the court to “set his request for a permanent injunction for a full trial on the merits and, after the trial, issue a permanent injunction against Defendants and their employees, agents, and representatives from entering or being present on the Real Property in dispute without the express written consent of Plaintiff.”
Lindig is also requesting a jury trial, indicating a belief that he has a better chance of success before a jury than before a judge.
In a statement to Texas Scorecard, Johnson City ISD wrote, “The Johnson City Independent School District (JCISD) is aware of the claims regarding the property currently used by the Pleasant Hill Community Center. At this time, the dispute is in active litigation, with the JCISD being named a defendant in a suit filed by Mr. Trent Lindig; therefore, the JCISD is limited in what we can say publicly. However, in the interest of ensuring accurate information, the JCISD would like to clarify that the JCISD has not owned the property at issue since 1952 when its predecessor transferred it to the Pleasant Hill Community Center. The District will continue to respect the legal process and will not provide further comment while the matter is still pending.”
When asked the reason for refusing to return the property to the Lindig family, Sultemeier told Texas Scorecard, “It’s community value. How much value can you put on community? A community needs to stay connected in my opinion, and that’s one way to stay connected.”
Related Cases
Two other recent Texas cases underscore rising concern that courts increasingly favor government parties in land disputes.
Last July, Texas Scorecard reported on a case in which the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) acquired property through the threat of eminent domain to construct a road alongside State Highway 99 near Houston.
After the road was rerouted, TxDOT acknowledged that 20,000 square feet of the land was no longer necessary for public use, but still refused to sell it back to the original owner. The State argues that it does not have to sell the land back since it was acquired by threat of eminent domain rather than through eminent domain.
The trial court in Harris County agreed with the State, but the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston sided with the original property owner. The State appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas, where the case is currently awaiting a decision.
In October, Texas Scorecard covered the Taylor City Council’s approval of a Blueprint Data Center on land the city owns near a residential area. However, a 1999 deed restriction required the land “to be held in trust for future use as parkland by Williamson County.”
Residents of Taylor filed a lawsuit against Blueprint’s parent company on July 31. However, Judge Ryan Lawson of the 395th District Court dismissed all the residents’ claims and denied their request for an injunction on October 8.
Plaintiffs are reportedly in the process of appealing the decision, maintaining that the land must be used in accordance with the deed restriction.
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