



HURRICANE HARVEY AFTER ACTION REVIEW

05 November 2017

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J3



TEXAS MILITARY DEPARTMENT

TEXAS MILITARY DEPARTMENT STRATEGY

VISION:

America's premier state military comprised of mission-ready professionals fully engaged with our communities, and relevant through the 21st century.

MISSION:

Provide the Governor and President with ready forces in support of state and federal authorities at home and abroad.

PEOPLE FIRST – Invest in our human capital

- Diverse & Engaged Force Sustained Through Effective Retention & Recruiting
- Trained Ethical Professionals
- Resilient Professionals & Families, Supported By Robust Services
- Clearly Communicated Opportunities For Professional & Personal Development

RELEVANT & READY – Provide right force at the right time

- Force Structure Optimized For Federal & State Missions
- Modern Training Areas & Facilities That Support Our Mission
- Effective Resource Management & Protection
- Enhanced Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental & Multinational Capabilities

COMMUNICATE & PARTNER – Deliver our message and build lasting relationships

- Effective Communication Assets & Channels
- Partnered & Informed Communities
- Engaged & Educated Government Partners
- Strong Department of Defense Relationships



TEXAS MILITARY DEPARTMENT



AGENDA

Opening Remarks

Purpose / End State

Scope of AAR

Rules of Engagement

TMD Mission and Response

Trends

AAR – by Joint Warfighting Function

Alibis

Closing Remarks



OPENING REMARKS

Adjutant General



Purpose:

- Identify deficiencies, sustain strengths, and focus on improved performance
- Share with others who are planning, developing, implementing, and evaluating similar efforts

End State:

- Maintain lessons learned for future events
- Official AAR will be published and archived in JLLIS
- TMD DSCA response plan is improved, communicated, and understood
- TMD is better manned, equipped, trained and postured for DSCA



SCOPE OF AFTER ACTION REVIEW

- Slides are a representative sample
 - Received and reviewed in excess of 400 observations from all components (DOMOPS, TXARNG, TXANG, TXSG, OED, and DoD)
- Focused on observations which impact more than one unit or component
- All observations will be consolidated and published



RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

- Slides should generate discussion, 2½ minutes per slide
- Open dialogue is encouraged to prepare us for the next disaster
- All questions or inputs are beneficial
- Identify items for development and referral to the JPG




OVERVIEW OF HURRICANE HARVEY



Three separate major disasters

- Hurricane landfall at Rockport/Port Aransas as a Category 4
- Massive flooding in the greater Houston area
- Isolated areas received up to 60.58 inches of rain from 24 August through 1 September
- Catastrophic river flooding in Beaumont, Port Arthur, and Orange
- First time Texas appointed a Dual Status Commander and Governor orders a complete TMD activation



TEXAS MILITARY DEPARTMENT

MISSION

Provide the Governor and the President with Ready Forces in Support of State & Federal Authorities at Home and Abroad

Guard Harvey Mission Totals

371 Air Hoist Rescues
16,012 Ground Rescues
18,137 People Evacuated
1,214 Animals Evacuated
26,040 People Sheltered
718 Animals Sheltered
382 Tons Cargo - Air

Phases of the Operation

Shape: Prior to event, TMD coordination with state and federal partners. Concept of operations planned and rehearsed in interagency and joint training exercises.

Anticipate: 19-21 Aug 2017, TMD receives warning from State Operations Center. Alerts issued to TMD elements, staff levels increased to level 4, Warning Order issued.

Respond: 22-24 Aug 2017, TMD activates Guardsmen and deployed Military District Coordinators to the field, staff levels increased to Level 3, Operations Order Issued.

Operate: 25 Aug -04 Sep 2017, TMD Staging areas, ground and air activation hubs activated, search and rescue assets (SAR) activated. Execute airborne SAR, ground, shelter, points of distribution, and other missions as required.

Stabilize: 05 Sep - 22 Sep 2017, TMD PODs fully operational. SAR and post landfall evacuation operations cease.

Transition: 23 Sep 2017, Support operations cease, retrograde complete



TEXAS MILITARY DEPARTMENT HARVEY RESPONSE BY THE NUMBERS

Ground Forces

17,415 Boots on Ground
859 Humvees
573 High Profile Vehicles
109 Boats
41 Shelter Teams
5 Comms Package

Total NG Air Support

289 Rotary Wing Missions
179 Fixed Wing Missions
 LUH-72 UH-60 CH-47 C-130

EMAC Support

26 States
3,007 personnel
Title 10 Ground
671 personnel

Guard Issued Commodities

215K Bags of Ice
214K Cases of Water
129K Cases of Meals



TEXAS MILITARY DEPARTMENT

TRENDS

- Command and Control
 - Dual Status Command
 - Integration
 - Authority
 - FTUS position vs Unit of Assignment
 - Knowledge Management
 - Adaptive Battle Staff/Plans
 - OPCON Transition
 - Task Organization
 - Communication
 - MRP Design
 - Mobilization Criteria
 - MDCs & LNOs
 - MRP vs. MTOE
- Information (Intelligence)
 - Incident Awareness & Assessment
 - Active Media Approach
- Movement & Maneuver
 - Changing Task Organization
 - Force Flow
 - Drivers
- Sustainment
 - STM Funding
 - Manning
 - Medical
 - Supplies & Services
 - Facility Use
 - Maintenance
 - Reports
 - JRSOI



Command and Control



Observation: Dual Status Command

Discussion: DSC was a success story. It was evident that the Dual Status Commander was better able to synchronize and develop coordinated support (Title 10 and NG) for Hurricane Harvey. The Dual Status Commander, through an integrated staff, was able to develop to coordinate forces working with each other. The synchronizing of missions allowed the National Guard to take the lead with incident commanders to “task” the best force (Title 10 or NG) to accomplish the mission.

Recommendation: Sustain DSC for operations.

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: Integration- Joint Interagency Teaming

Discussion: Liaison officers at various levels with direct coordination ability between all levels of the organization assisted in rapid decision making and provided timely decisions in an environment that was reactive. In the TFH TOC we built a team consisting of all Services, Active Component, DPS, Harris County Sheriff's Office, TXSG, and numerous other agencies. This was a huge enabler of success and needs to be formalized and grown. It would have been even more effective with the inclusion of more state agencies and other players in the JOA. The broader the depth of subject matter expertise, the easier it will be to rapidly solve problems that fall outside of the scope of the experience and training of the TF HQ. Furthermore, it allows the HQ to reach into other components and Services to access resources that would remain unknown save for the LNOs who know capabilities that can be leveraged against a problem set.

Recommendation: Continue to allow LNOs at all levels; forecast and include in DSCA catalog for all mission command packages.

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: Authority- National Guard and DoD assets self-deployed into disaster area

Discussion: A massive influx of good Samaritans from both the NG and DoD, without any coordination with the state or AOC self-deployed causing a massive amount of confusion, unnecessary man-hours to determine who, what, where, when, capabilities, etc. It also created safety issues with unannounced operations, aircrew unaware of Texas SPINS. Uncoordinated staging negatively impacted operations at KBPT. Max aircraft On Ground (MOG) was exceeded and forced compacted evacuation operations on an already small airfield. Ellington Field was overrun and unable to support self-staging aircraft and crews.

Recommendation: A NOTAM and/or TFR needs to be placed PRIOR to landfall of any hurricane. For any possible Houston strike, a TFR needs to be pre-emptively placed over KEFD. All FAA NOTAMS and TFRs will require contact with AOC-TX prior to takeoff.

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observations: FTUS vs Unit of Assignment-

Discussion: How do we overcome shortfalls due to State HQ/DOMOPS/Technician requirements? The Brigade HQ was not able to mobilize with the assigned organic staff members when the Brigade HQ was mobilized.

Recommendation: In the event a BN or BDE JTF mobilization, personnel that are assigned M-day to the response/JTF HQ (BDE or BN) are relieved of any full-time requirements and allowed to join their M-day units.

(Lo) Impact to Mission (Hi)



Observation: KM- CONPLAN 3500 Complicated and Inaccessible by TXANG

Discussion: CONPLAN only resides on eLSP. Only TXANG members with GuardNet accounts can VPN in. 38 separate links to 298 documents on CONPLAN PowerPoint webpage. Has not ever been produced in a single, searchable pdf.

Recommendation: Hurricane SOP (DRAFT) is a step in the right direction. Only available as draft <30 days prior to Harvey. TXANG needs individual supplement to Hurricane SOP to provide wings with TXANG specific additional instructions and procedures.

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: ABS / Plans- Crisis Action Planning (CAP).

Discussion: Throughout the mission there was little to no time for deliberate planning. Perhaps the best window for such planning existed between 0000-0400 when the operational tempo slacked. However, outside of that relatively small window decisions had to be made rapidly. As such the BDE HQ developed a CAP battle drill whereby the commander would provide initial guidance and a selected team of stakeholders, SMEs, and planners would immediately convene and produce a handwritten “kneeboard.” This product would be reviewed by the commander, adjusted as needed, and then approved for dissemination. This handwritten kneeboard would be photographed and immediately distributed via text message. Subsequently, the product would be formalized into a clean digital slide and published in a written order, time permitting. This enabled the ground commanders to immediately begin activity rather than wait for their higher HQ to produce a clean product.

Recommendation: Continue this practice and set the expectation at the higher HQ that this rather informal method is effective and that they should expect to receive products in this format as a matter of exigency.

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: ABS- Orders Process

Discussion: The coordination of LOC-TX inputs into the daily FRAGO proved more difficult than necessary. The orders approval process needs to be more inclusive. Inputs were omitted or changed because the orders production team or orders approving authority were not fully aware of coordination that had occurred prior to input submission.

Recommendation: With the addition of multiple planning cells and operation centers, it is recommended that a FRAGO working group be held with a representative from each organization providing or receiving taskings into the FRAGO. The FRAGO working group would serve to ensure that all taskers have been properly coordinating prior to publication.

Establishment of an order approval process that allows expedited approval is recommended in order to ensure short suspense or late notice taskings are published prior to suspense date published in order.

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: [ABS / Plans](#)- Decision was made to implement the Adaptive Battle Staff at a higher capacity than SOP, integrating JFHQ, Army and Division planners.

Discussion: No clear guidance was given on what the roles and responsibilities were for each component's planning team personnel. Representation from all joint functions/warfighting functions were not met resulting in stove piping of plans primarily in movement and maneuver and sustainment. Additionally, due to Army having the preponderance of forces and planners, the other components (Joint - Air, State Guard, Title 10) were neglected, resulting in an Army Plans Group.

Recommendation: If merging is a necessity, clear and concise guidance must be given to the "Joint Plans Group" and justification for the decision (were gaps identified in the current process, was the troops to tasks not adequate, etc.). Required attendees, outputs, battle rhythm, etc. must be directed and individuals and organizations held accountable.

(Lo)  (Hi)



Observation: [ABS](#)- Inadequate TXANG/AOC-TX/DOMOPS Staffing Augmentation

Discussion: The AOC-TX and TXANG A-Staff needs to be more robust to handle large scale and extended disaster response operations. Staff augmentation roster did not factor 147 ATKW personnel being unavailable. There were too many cells and meetings for TXANG personnel to be included in, which led to inadequate TXANG representation at all DOMOPS/JTF levels. With a higher percentage of AGR personnel, we need the ability to utilize them without a time restriction. Impacted AOC and A3 operations negatively.

Recommendation: AOC-TX becomes a separate MRP and not embedded in DOMOPS ABS. TXANG ABS roster increased to allow for representation at JPG, CUOPS, FUOPS, and appropriate J-staffs.

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: [ABS](#)- No AOC-TX LNOs were present in the SOC

Discussion: Needs were slow to be communicated for aerial responses and what assets could be used (T32, T10), both from the AOC and the SOC.

Recommendation: The AOC-TX needs two LNOs located in the SOC. Rotary wing and fixed wing LNOs, O-5/6. It may not be possible, feasible, or desirable to co-locate the AOC-TX with the SOC, but this will vastly improve the coordination and communication.

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: OPCON Transition

Discussion: Was not clear when troop accountability begins. Is it after JRSOI happens, after actual entry/departure of the JOA or as soon as FRAGO states OPCON. There was confusion on the actual transition for forces between commands. TF51/JFLCC FWD, created a movement order, which provided some clarity, but times the movement order conflicted with the JFLCC Main FRAGO.

Recommendation: Develop a clear method for force transition between commands .



Observation: Task organization was abandoned early in the mobilization.

Discussion: The burden of task of organization fell upon gentleman agreements at the BN level. This process was confusing to the units at the CO MRP level. Verbal orders and orders by text outpaced the ability of the Mission Command team to staff logistical requirements. Units were instructed to relocate in different AO's without clear reporting lines. Orders were received either verbally or by text.

Recommendation: Initially TF Central North was assigned as the main effort and had the greatest number of assigned MRP's. Rather than moving TF Central North mission command into TF East's AO, only the down trace MRP's should have been relocated, or new AO boundary lines should have been created.

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: Communications- SAD Cell Phones were primary form of communication between higher, lower and adjacent units.

Discussion: SAD Cell Phones were a great tool except in the areas where cell service was substandard and during operations when more immediate means of communication would have served the mission better like push to talk phones or ICOM Radios. FM communication was not feasible between all units due to distance.

Recommendation: Recommend the sourcing of hand-held radios for future missions and minimize/limit the use of SAD cell-phones to MRP and Mission Commanders. Conduct Quarterly COMMEX on equipment that is O/H. Ensure JBC-P/JCR are added to FY18 training plans (fielded in April 2017) Some units do not have MBITR radios per MTOE.

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observations: MRP Design / Functional MRPs- Mission Ready Packages were not used efficiently to maximize asset effectiveness.

Discussion: Additional MRPs based on functional capability (Engineer) that TMD can constitute/advertise in the Mission Ready Package Catalog. The tradeoff is that forces used in these MRPs are unavailable for commitment to Multi-Function Companies and GTCs. Boat MRP – 551MRBC has # boats that can be used for search and rescue purposes. This solution would need to be balanced against AERF readiness commitments, as well as any potential bridging requirements in the crisis response. Multi-Engineer Company (MEC) MRP – This MRP has a variety of engineer capabilities along the lines of debris removal, extraction capability, etc. This package can be tailored from the individual Soldier with a chain saw, to a skid steer loader (i.e. Bobcat), to a D7R Dozer.

Recommendation: MRPs should be assigned functionally when possible, to minimize the unit impact/effort required to constitute the MRP.

(Lo) Impact to Mission (Hi)



Observation: [Mobilization Criteria](#)- Mobilizing Affected Area Soldiers

Discussion: Clear guidance on exempt personnel due to impact areas

Recommendation: Guidance flow from the top down and supported by all levels of

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: LNOs- LNOs assigned to Task Force HQ and Battalion HQs

Discussion: TXSG LNOs assigned to DOMOPS Units in the AOR and JOC completed their task as assigned. Some of the assigned LNOs were used as part of the TF HQ's staff and assisted with the mission. Addition coordination between the NG units and TXSG would assist with TXSG LNOs role within the HQs

Recommendation: TXSG LNOs need to be integrated into assigned Brigade and Battalion HQ's staff while they are conducting DSCA training. Commanders would have a greater confidence with TXSG Personnel and their assignments. TXSG would have a better understanding of the needs of the HQ.

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: MRP vs MTOE- Doctrinal configuration vs Force Package.

Discussion: Are force packages the optimal configuration for DSCA?

Recommendation: Maintain unit integrity and align threat level requirements with organic unit level assets.

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Information (Intelligence)



Observation: The Incident Awareness and Assessment (IAA) process was not well established prior to the hurricane and was developed during the event.

Discussion: During the hurricane, it became very apparent that the IAA process was not streamlined or established between the J2 and the Air Guard, which hindered the functionality of the IAA entities. The J2 was able to develop an IAA organization chart/process that assisted during the current hurricane and the Air Guard developed an IAA process that was immediately effective.

Recommendation: Develop an IAA plan and process that will ease the flow of information, requirements and approvals in conjunction with the components. Once established, the J2 will incorporate into Annex B, CONPLAN 3500.

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: Active Media Approach

Discussion: The media interest around Hurricane Harvey was substantial, and TMD capitalized on the opportunity to tell our story. As such, the state PAO, in coordination with senior leadership, made the decision to take a very active media approach, seeking out high-level media interviews and, eventually, allowing civilian media embeds. In addition, TMD leaned forward on social media, which gave us high, consistent visibility and enabled us to adequately shape and reinforce our messages to the public.

Recommendation: We should sustain the practice of having high-level TMD surrogates available and willing to do interviews. This helps us stay on the top-of-mind for members of the media and allows us to drive home our message over and over. In the future, we should permit civilian media embeds as soon as possible, especially during the critical early phase of an operation. We should also continue studying, growing and refining our social media audiences so our content makes the greatest impact.

(Lo)  (Hi)



Movement and Maneuver



Observation: Changing Task Organization / Flow into the JOA.

Discussion: It took the TF about 3 days to conduct an accurate accounting of all forces in the JOA. After the initial set of forces came into the JOA follow on forces came in, in a majority of instances, in a disorganized fashion. This made it nearly impossible to accurately account for who was where doing what. Many units self deployed to include both Texas units as well as units from out of state that came into the JOA. There was continual confusion as to what units were at what LSA and when they would be able to move. Furthermore, the push function, while well intentioned to provide maximum support, in most cases only served to create more problems for task force commanders who had neither missions nor the capacity to support inbound troops. Once a total mobilization was directed little concern was given to prudent use of resources and many troops and equipment sat unused for extended periods

Recommendation: Prioritize the emplacement of a JRSOI system earlier in the mission and ruthlessly enforce its usage. Provide command emphasis to drive units through the system so that the task force commander can correctly apportion his forces in the most economic manner possible.

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Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: Drivers- Light Infantry Battalions are limited in High Profile Vehicles and drivers. Light Infantry Companies have one LMTV and one HUMMWV.

Discussion: The initial call up exhausted most of the High Profile Vehicles drivers and A-drivers in the Battalion to include the supporting FSC. As units were called up to the LSAs, those without vehicles remained at the LSAs, while those with vehicles received missions. The Hurricane ROC drill never addressed calling up the entire Division.

Recommendation: Units must train additional drivers in order to have replacements once a relief in place is conducted or follow on forces move into the JOA.

(Lo)  (Hi)



Sustainment



Observation: State Training and Missions Funding

Discussion: The allocation of STM funds to components, and the ability to utilize funding for purchases allowed for an overwhelming IT success for the TXANG and AOC-TX. Nearly every item procured was utilized and critical.

Recommendation: As legislative funding permits, continue the STM process with component discretion on training and equipment allocations.

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: ABS- AG4 manning issues when supporting the J4 cell for DSCA.

Discussion: AG4 Full Time Manning consist of Soldiers that are not assigned to JFHQ, this limits the number of available Soldiers to in the J4 cell. AG4 did not have enough Soldiers to support the J4.

Recommendation: Assign Key Logistics Personnel to work in the J4 cell during DSCA operations, especially 24 hour ops. Manning for J4 support needs to be based on the number of Soldiers activated for DSCA. Design a Footprint able to support operations for all types of DSCA operations.

For Event the Size of Harvey: 12 NCO's for J4 Call Center (6 Day/6 Night), 2 Officers for JOC J5 (1 Day/1 Night), 2 Officers for JOC J1/J4 (1 Day/1 Night), Add 4 NCO/Officer MCT cell (4 Day/4 Night).

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: Medical- No Effective Concept of Medical Support / Medical Threat within JOA.

Discussion:

- a. DSCA MRPs NOT designed to provide AHS support.
- b. Lack of medical support for Soldiers within JOA.
 - (1) There was a strong focus on medical STAR and a lack of focus on AHS support for Soldiers within the JOA.
 - (2) Some Soldiers, within the JOA, did not receive medical care for up to 10 x days.
 - (a) 34 x Environmental/Dermatological (skin rashes, foot fungus, and infected bug bites).
 - (b) 26 x Musculoskeletal (fractures, ligament strains or sprains, and muscle strains).
 - (c) 44 x Ear, Nose, Throat (ENT) and Respiratory illness (common cold, flu, bronchitis, sore throat, sinus infection, and ear infection)
 - (d) 16 x Gastrointestinal (dehydration, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, fever, and diarrhea).
 - (e) 866 x Soldiers received health and welfare checks by a provider that included full medical and behavioral assessments.

Recommendation:

- a. Each TF/sector will have a Role I established (with Class VIII) as far forward IOT provide AHS support.
- b. 111 MMB, 162nd MCAS, C Co 949 BSB, and C Co 536 BSB will ONLY provide Role I and Role II. MRP GTCs will be task organized by other elements within the organization.
- c. The 111 MMB FHP cell, along with Role I assets, are always initially deployed on any DSCA mission IOT support the TF Surgeon.
- d. 111 MMB FHP cell is initially responsible for establishing the medical concept of support / medical threat with the TF Surgeon. The TF Surgeon needs OPCON of ALL Role I and Role II units IOT support STAR and Soldiers within the JOA.
- e. Immediately upon any DSCA mission, the designated Medical Mission Command element will publish a medical threat and update as needed. The medical threat will be effectively communicated to all TF Commanders within the JOA.
- f. Create a DSCA Class VIII formulary and issue 7 x DOS of Class VIII to all medical personnel prior to deployment into the JOA.



Observation: Supplies and Services- Improper Ordering of Supplies.

Discussion: Ordering of all classes of supplies is the sole responsibility of the JLOC in emergency missions. MIPERS for class VIII were established very early for support but other commands started ordering medical supplies out side the approved channels. Commands outside DOMPOS were placing orders for supplies and service (MREs, Cots, Bottle water, CLS Bags, Equipment Repair Services, ice, dumpsters) that the JLOC staff was not aware of and did not approve. These supplies and services cost the State hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Recommendation: All Commands follow the process of ordering supplies and service through the J4 for proper obligation authority and accountability of State funds.

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: Supplies and Services- KEFD was both a casualty and an asset as well.

Discussion: Chaos. Aircraft and units were directed (or self-deployed) to Ellington without any coordination with the 147 ATKW CAT and EOC, despite the fact that these cells were obviously active in the TXANG Air COP chat room. Aircraft arriving without personnel / equip ready to receive them, expecting services (i.e., fuel) that the base could not spare because we needed to operate.

Recommendation: 147 ATKW was the host unit for the only major DoD/National Guard power projection platform remaining operational in the strike zone. A better ride out plan and pre-coordination of needs has to be developed.

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: Supplies and Services / Fuel- Inadequate procurement and voyager card controls

Discussion: DOMOPS was responsible for coordinating and purchasing goods and services for the mission, the needs for the mission were not clearly defined, the agency's spending limits constantly changed, and there were no clear approvals or spending limits.

The voyager cards were being copied and the copied cards were distributed and used at various locations.

Recommendation: Develop a specific plan of action for emergency purchase. Purchasing & Contracts meet with DOMOPS to determine anticipated needs, and establish an action plan detailing how and when procurement cards will be used.

Voyager cards require additional training on proper use.

(Lo) Impact to Mission (Hi)



Observation: Use of facilities- Lack of timely guidance regarding lease agreements.

Discussion: The Executive Director, OED, should enter into lease agreements for third party owned facilities and commit State funds on behalf of TMD for emergency response operations. In several cases, units occupied privately-owned properties and/or facilities with no prior coordination or execution of a signed lease agreement. This could have resulted in the unauthorized commitment of State funds and put the agency at financial risk for any damages and/or other liabilities in the absence of an agreement.

Recommendation: Recommend the dissemination of a lease agreement template and a clearly defined process for executing an agreement for use and occupation of privately-owned properties to all MRPs prior to activation and onward integration. Additionally, authority to occupy privately-owned facilities should reside with the senior mission commander with the concurrence of the CFMO and Executive Director, OED.

(Lo) Impact to Mission (Hi)



Observation: Maintenance- Lack of Support Capabilities at BDE MC Level.

Discussion: As the mission wore on units lacked the ability to conduct level 10 or level 20 maintenance, conduct simple repairs, or replenish medical supplies, among other things. During the post-landfall period vehicles and personnel degraded quickly due to sustained operations in a wet environment. Once operations continued past the first seven days this maintenance need became critical as units lacked the capability and repair parts stock to undertake immediate repairs. Pushing support assets forward in the initial surge, to include a robust sustainment cell and many outside LNOs in the BDE MC MRP would have alleviated this problem. At a minimum it would have pushed back the critical point allowing units to sustain themselves longer.

Recommendation: Refine BN MC MRPs to include parts trailers with contact trucks and the necessary PLL to conduct repairs as well as putting in place contracts or allowing the use of purchase cards to enable units to conduct repairs on their own. Additionally, add additional sustainment cell pax to include medical and supporting unit LNOs to BDE MC MRPs.

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: Maintenance

Discussion: Units routinely exceeded vehicle fording capabilities. Fuelers and wreckers are critical components for MRPs and FMSs, and should be tracked and tasked regardless of who they belong to.

Recommendation:

- Maintenance requirements identified as <12 hours, >12 hours, specific faults as a result of excessive high water fording.
- J4/G4 Surface Maintenance needs to retain the ability to task Maintenance and Recovery assets to include Personnel (Technicians).
- Identify wrecker/Maintenance Teams and how they are accounted for and to whom they are attached to, whether to the MRPs via DOMOPS/JOC or SEMFs (one wrecker, one contact truck, four PAX).
- Ensure that FMSs in the JOA are able to respond with recovery assets (wreckers/contact trucks within MRPs or attached to FMSs).

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: Reports within the PEMS were not useful for pay reconciliation.

Discussion: Pay reconciliation reports require a standardized report from the system of record for State Active Duty Pay. An (All-in-one) report had to be generated using multiple unit attendance rosters. This report requires roughly one hour to combine data from multiple spreadsheets into one report.

Recommendation: Add a report to the system (PEMS) that includes all required data for users at all levels (unit through state). Format of Mass (PEMS) report sent daily between 30 August 2017 – 15 September 2017 by TXARNG G1 can be used as an example to build the required report for pay reconciliation.

(Lo)

Impact to Mission

(Hi)



Observation: JRSOI- USNORTHCOM still unable to do JRSOI for all service forces

Discussion: JTF had little SA on units conducting/completing JRSOI, and we know of USAF and some Marine forces that did not go through JRSOI. This shields units from important information about their operations in the JOA, inhibits our ability to ensure they have the right equipment to operate in the JOA, and weakens the handoff mechanism between TF-51 and the JTF. Since the change in law in 2011 that allows a DSC for Consequence Management events, USNORTHCOM has not been able to conduct JRSOI for all the military forces that fall under a DSC, because forces go from service control directly to the DSC without instruction/information about JRSOI requirements. The services do not provide the forces to the JFLCC to conduct JRSOI, unless they are told to by a USNORTHCOM order. If JFLCC/TF-51 knows about a military force that is being transferred to the DSC, they attempt to get them through JRSOI.

Recommendation: USNORTHCOM needs to figure out how to get all Title 10 forces through JRSOI. Require services and mandating through JRSOI prior to hand-off to the DSC. It is unclear if the services (USN, USAF, USMC) even have the capability to conduct JRSOI for their forces operating in the area. Indications during Hurricane Harvey that the service forces (USN, USAF, USMC) did not go through JRSOI while provided support outside the DSC, even though the services had them OPCON.



Observation: JRSOI- Workers' Compensation Insurance

Discussion: Improve processes for gathering accurate required data for Workers' Compensation Insurance to reduce processing delays during periods of exceptionally high activity. Untimely or improperly completed documents may result in the **delayed receipt of:** needed medical services; reimbursement of out-of-pocket medical expenses; and/or temporary income benefits.

Recommendation:

- (1) Work with DOMOPS to update and finalize detailed Standard Operating Procedures related to TMD State Active Duty (SAD) Service Member benefits (currently in draft form).
- (2) Clarify forms and information provided to service members when they come on SAD.
- (3) Develop an effective a way to quickly sort Workers' Compensation documents between claims and incident reports.
- (4) Work with DOMOPS on the possibility of the SAD assignment of a service member(s) to State HR during (and for a period after) the mission to assist with timely processing of the increased volume of Workers' Compensation claims.

(Lo)



Impact to Mission

(Hi)



ALIBIS



CLOSING REMARKS



DUTY

BEAR TRUE FAITH & ALLEGIANCE TO THE STATE AND NATION. CULTIVATE AN ENVIRONMENT FOR ALL TO EXCEL. PREPARE MENTALLY, PHYSICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY TO DEPLOY AT HOME AND ABROAD. BE READY WHEN CALLED.

HONOR

HOLD THE PUBLIC TRUST IN THE HIGHEST REGARD, EXCEED STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS. ACT WITH UNDERSTANDING, INNOVATION, RESOURCEFULNESS, FLEXIBILITY AND URGENCY. DO ALL YOU CAN, WHERE YOU ARE, WITH WHAT YOU HAVE & ALWAYS PLACE THE WELFARE OF THOSE YOU LEAD FIRST.

TEXAS

EMBRACE THE COURAGEOUS SPIRIT OF OUR PEOPLE, HISTORY & CULTURE.