



## **Filing Receipt**

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TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

**EDDIE MORALES, JR.**

District 74

March 12<sup>th</sup>, 2026

Chairman Thomas J. Gleeson  
Public Utility Commission of Texas  
William B. Travis Building  
1701 N. Congress Ave  
Austin, TX 78701

**RE: Legislative Inquiry Regarding the Howard-Solstice 765 kV Transmission Line Project**

Dear Chairman Gleeson:

I am writing regarding the proposed Howard-Solstice 765 kV transmission line project and the routing alternatives currently under consideration by the Public Utility Commission of Texas.

My office has been contacted by numerous constituents and stakeholders regarding potential impacts of certain proposed routes on the Devils River watershed, conservation easements, and privately owned ranchlands in Val Verde County and surrounding areas. In addition to these environmental and landowner concerns, my office has also been made aware that some routing alternatives may cross or closely approach large tracts of land reportedly owned by entities connected to Chinese national interests, including companies associated with Mr. Sun Guangxin and Xinjiang Guanghui Industry Investment Group.

Because this project involves major electric transmission infrastructure that will become part of the ERCOT grid, these concerns raise potential questions regarding compliance with existing state laws and directives intended to protect Texas critical infrastructure from foreign adversarial influence.

As you are aware, the Lone Star Infrastructure Protection Act (S.B. 2116, 87th Legislature) was enacted to prevent governmental entities from entering into agreements related to critical infrastructure with companies owned or controlled by citizens or governments of certain foreign adversaries, including the People's Republic of China. Texas Government Code Chapter 2275 prohibits governmental entities from entering into agreements relating to critical infrastructure if the company involved is owned or controlled by citizens of designated countries such as China.

Additionally, Executive Order GA-49, issued November 19, 2024, directs state agencies to strengthen protections against foreign adversaries targeting Texas critical infrastructure and highlights concerns that the People's Republic of China has sought access to infrastructure sectors including communications, transportation, water, and energy systems.

My office has been informed by stakeholders that several routing alternatives currently under consideration may cross, approach, or rely upon lands reportedly owned by entities connected to Chinese national interests. Based on information provided to our office, the following route alternatives may raise potential concerns under the Lone Star Infrastructure Protection Act and related state policies protecting critical infrastructure:

124, 127, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 155, and 156.

Stakeholders have indicated that these routes may cross, approach, or depart from land owned by entities associated with Chinese ownership interests. If accurate, these routing alternatives could raise questions regarding compliance with state law or, at minimum, whether such routes should be avoided as a matter of prudent infrastructure security policy.

Given these developments, my office believes there are two important considerations for the Commission as it evaluates routing alternatives for the Howard–Solstice project:

First, whether existing statutory or regulatory restrictions, including the Lone Star Infrastructure Protection Act, Government Code Chapter 2275, Executive Order GA-49, and related state policies intended to protect critical infrastructure, may apply in circumstances where transmission infrastructure would cross or rely upon land owned or controlled by entities affiliated with Chinese companies or individuals connected to the Chinese Communist Party.

Second, even in circumstances where these provisions may not directly prohibit a routing alternative, whether prudent avoidance of potential security risks should be considered when evaluating routes that would involve land owned or controlled by entities connected to foreign adversaries.


In light of these concerns, I respectfully request clarification from the Commission on the following matters:

1. Has the Commission evaluated whether any proposed Howard–Solstice routing alternatives cross or rely upon land owned by entities affiliated with Chinese companies or individuals connected to the Chinese Communist Party?
2. Does the Commission believe that the Lone Star Infrastructure Protection Act or Government Code Chapter 2275 may apply in situations where easements, leases, or other agreements are required for transmission infrastructure located on land owned by such entities?
3. Has the Commission evaluated whether Executive Order GA-49 or other state policies regarding critical infrastructure protection should inform routing decisions for this project?
4. How does the Commission intend to account for these considerations when evaluating routing alternatives and determining the final route for the Howard–Solstice project?

Given the Legislature's clear intent to safeguard Texas' critical infrastructure from foreign adversarial influence, ensuring that these issues are fully evaluated is of significant importance to the communities affected by this project.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. My office appreciates the Commission's continued engagement with impacted communities and looks forward to your response.

Sincerely,

  
**Eddie Morales, Jr.**  
State Representative