State lawmakers recommended action to shield university research from infiltration, but a security specialist found their recommendations lacking.

A Texas House committee report analyzed hostile foreign threats to Texas. Higher education was among the vulnerable areas identified.

“Universities, as hubs of innovation, research, and global collaboration, may inadvertently expose themselves to espionage, coercion, or undue influence,” committee members wrote. “Implementing enhanced security measures across multiple domains will help protect these institutions from becoming gateways for foreign interference and ensure national security remains intact.”

As covered previously by Texas Scorecard, research in higher education is a critical component of technological advancement in America, including military applications.

Texas A&M University, multiple branches of the University of Texas System, and Texas Tech University are U.S. defense contractors.

A specialist interviewed in that article found state lawmakers’ work in the House report lacking. “The committee missed the research security elements, focusing on old news related to cybersecurity and recruitment programs,” wrote Allen Phelps, CEO of Dallas-based research security firm IPTalons. “The biggest problem in Texas (and the rest of the country) is that the State does not provide specific mandates to address each identified [vulnerability].”

Committee members listed four key threats in their report.

Foreign Gifts and Contracts

“Foreign governments and entities may leverage large donations or contracts to influence university operations, including academic programs, hiring decisions, or research agendas,” committee members wrote. “Insufficient transparency around the source and conditions of foreign funding creates opportunities for undue influence that can undermine institutional integrity.”

Committee members recommended “mandating full disclosure and monitoring of foreign contributions to universities” to “help prevent undue influence.”

Foreign Researchers and Talent Recruitment Programs

“Some adversarial nations use foreign researchers or recruitment programs (such as China’s Thousand Talents Program) to gain access to sensitive technologies and intellectual property,” committee members wrote. “These individuals, while contributing academically, may pose risks by transmitting research findings or technology back to their home governments.”

Committee members recommended “enhanced screening of foreign researchers.” “Universities should adopt vetting procedures for visiting scholars and foreign researchers, especially in sensitive research areas,” they wrote.

Phelps felt committee members didn’t go far enough. He offered multiple recommendations to strengthen research security.

First, he believed the committee shouldn’t be vague by failing to specify particular research areas. Language should be added that names research areas like critical technology sectors identified by the Department of Defense, the White House, research grant funding agencies, and corporate-sponsored research. Phelps wrote these should be updated at least annually.

Second, increase accountability. “The State of Texas needs to establish a State-level standard for screening foreign researchers applying for graduate studies, doctoral programs, or postdoctoral programs at Universities in Texas,” he wrote.

Third, Phelps recommended Texas implement “Enhanced Researcher Foreign Affiliation Risk Reporting.” “The State of Texas needs to establish a State-level reporting system that requires every researcher employed by or associated with a Texas University to report their foreign research affiliations, including the names of foreign-based researchers and research entities with which the Texas-based researcher is collaborating,” he wrote. “The researchers must also report all of their sources of research funding, financial interests, and other interests related to foreign entities or institutions, including companies with which the Texas-based researcher is affiliated.”

Fourth, Phelps wrote researchers should be required to send annual reports to the Texas Department of Public Safety. When a researcher “adds a new foreign affiliation,” then these reports should be updated within 30 days. “DPS should contract with a research security expert resource to review the submissions and identify high-risk foreign affiliations that require investigation and risk remediation steps,” he added.

Fifth, DPS should have an auditing program. This would evaluate the reporting programs at Texas universities and ensure they’re following state guidelines.

Traveling Abroad

“Faculty, students, and researchers traveling internationally are at risk of being surveilled, coerced, or having their devices compromised,” committee members wrote. “Laptops and research data may be exposed to cyber threats or espionage if insufficient precautions are taken.”

Committee members recommended travel security protocols. “Institutions must educate faculty and students on cybersecurity practices and protocols when traveling to high-risk areas,” they wrote. “Encrypted devices and virtual private networks (VPNs) should be provided to protect sensitive research data.”

Phelps made multiple recommendations here too.

He pointed out committee members should have added language that takes into account the laws and rules of the travel destination.

Second, Phelps wrote institutions “must” put in place a foreign travel reporting program. This would document and track the international travels of their researchers, faculty, and students. “This data should be used to identify risks of foreign affiliation and suspicious travel patterns,” he wrote.

Third, institutions should be required to train researchers, faculty, and students traveling outside the U.S. on research security, how to protect research assets, and foreign influence risks. “Training topics should include basic counterintelligence, elicitation, and counter-elicitation in the context of research security,” Phelps wrote.

Exploited Research Partnerships

“Collaborative research with foreign institutions can expose universities to risks when partnerships are not properly vetted,” committee members wrote. “Foreign adversaries may exploit joint research projects to gain access to classified information, cutting-edge technologies, or intellectual property.”

To button this area down, committee members recommended evaluating research collaborations. “Government-university partnerships can help develop frameworks for managing international collaborations more effectively,” they wrote. “Research partnerships should undergo thorough risk assessments to ensure they align with national security interests.”

Phelps pointed out they should have added “interests of the State of Texas” at the end.

The Need for Accountability

The interim report was put together by the Texas House Select Committee on Securing Texas from Hostile Foreign Organizations. The chairman of the seven-member committee was State Rep. Cole Hefner (R–Mount Pleasant).

Phelps found the work of lawmakers lacking in that it did not require more accountability from state universities. “Allowing universities, for example, to develop risk management solutions opens the door to interpretation. It will result in various research security programs that may or may not address the concerns outlined in the report,” he wrote. “Texas needs to publish a Research Security Program Framework that establishes specific requirements related to research security, foreign influence, export controls, cybersecurity related to protecting research data, foreign travel security, and conflicts of interest.”

After Texas mandates every institution of higher education follow the state standard, compliance should be audited and assessed by DPS or a qualified contractor, Phelps wrote.

Hefner did not respond to a request for comment on Phelps’ criticisms and recommendations.

What Phelps and committee members agree on is that hostile powers are targeting research in higher education.

“Foreign influence, espionage, and coercion within higher education systems present significant challenges to national security. Universities must balance the pursuit of academic collaboration with the need to protect sensitive research from foreign exploitation,” committee members wrote. “Increased scrutiny and security measures across domains such as foreign funding, travel, research partnerships, and foreign researchers are essential to safeguarding public universities and preventing them from inadvertently undermining national interests.”

Texas Tech University System wrote in a statement that they are taking steps to address this threat. “The TTU System and its institutions are aware of the ongoing security efforts for higher education found in this interim report and continued prioritization by state leadership,” they wrote. “In accordance with state law and the Governor’s Executive Orders, the TTU System and its institutions are working to increase protections from foreign influence and will be working with state leaders, the Legislature, and others in higher education on additional recommendations during this legislative session.”

The Texas A&M University System and the University of Texas System did not respond to a request for comment.

The threat from hostile powers to higher education was covered in the interim report from the Texas House Select Committee on Securing Texas from Hostile Foreign Organizations, published in December 2024. The report covered multiple theaters in Texas under threat, and more will be explored in future articles.

Robert Montoya

Born in Houston, Robert Montoya is an investigative reporter for Texas Scorecard. He believes transparency is the obligation of government.

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