Specialist Warns University Research Vulnerable To Hostile Powers

A specialist argues higher education research in Texas remains vulnerable to infiltration. Hostile powers, including China’s Communist Party, are trying to steal critical technology gestating in American higher education.

Espionage doesn’t typically come to mind when one thinks of colleges or universities. However, given their close relationships with defense research, universities are targets.

“If you think of American innovation, most of the critical technology that we depend on today for our economic and national security started its life off at a university,” Allen Phelps told Texas Scorecard. Phelps once worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. Today, he’s the founder and CEO of IPTalons. The Dallas-based company is a managed research security services provider.

Phelps helps institutions analyze their security risks. He’s alarmed over security risks in higher education research.

“The reason I’m going crazy [is] because I see this data every day, and I go, this is not getting better, despite all the rhetoric,” Phelps explained. “Foreign influence groups (‘FIGs’) linked to China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (‘Countries of Concern’ or ‘CoC’) intentionally target the best scientists, academic research institutions, and private enterprises to secure valuable trade secrets, intellectual property, and inventions.”

Red Flags

IPTalons developed a tool to give a “Foreign Collaboration Risk Analysis.” Phelps demonstrated it to Texas Scorecard.

He looked at a Texas state agency that funds research with taxpayer monies: the Cancer Prevention and Research Institute of Texas. Also called CPRIT, this agency funds research on cancer prevention and cures.

IPTalons analyzed 100 CPRIT scholars for foreign research collaborations from 2021 to 2024. Phelps explained such collaborations “are essential indicators of foreign influence risk.” If a collaborator is from a nation known to be hostile to the United States, Phelps said that is a red flag.

Of the 100 CPRIT scholars analyzed, IPTalons found 50 “have foreign research collaboration relationships with a FIG [foreign influence group] associated with a Country of Concern.” Of those 50, IPTalons found 18 CPRIT scholars with research collaborations with foreign influence groups connected to a “very high-risk” country of concern.

“Very high-risk entities hold security credentials to perform People’s Republic of China defense research, have been flagged by government entities, or have been known to engage in espionage or misconduct,” Phelps wrote.

That’s a 1,000-foot view. But what can these collaborations look like? Phelps zoomed in on one specific example from IPTalons’ research. On October 31, 2023, Nature.com published a research paper on genes authored by Liya Gu, Yaping Huang, and Guo-Min Li. All three at the time were shown to be from the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center’s Radiation Oncology department. This center is a branch of the University of Texas System. Multiple branches of the University of Texas System (UTS) are U.S. defense contractors.

IPTalons’ analysis reported that Gu’s co-authors had connections with Tsinghua University and Zhejiang University in China. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute analyzes the security threats of Chinese universities. ASPI categorized Tsinghua University as being “very high risk” and Zhejiang University as “high risk.”

Tsinghua is the alma mater of Chinese President Xi Jinping. ASPI reported that it is “considered China’s leading university in science and technology.” It has a student enrollment of close to 40k students. For comparison, Texas A&M had about 79,000 enrolled in fall 2024.

Phelps said that there is “no​​ evidence of wrongdoing” in the collaboration for this paper.

The research paper also showed co-author Guo-Min Li was also employed with Chinese Institutes for Medical Research, located in Beijing. As of March 2024, Phelps found that, depending on the paper, Guo-Min Li will still list an affiliation with Chinese Institutes. “That’s where UT Southwestern should do an investigation,” he said. “In academia they’re called dual appointments. It’s pretty common for a faculty member to have a job in the US and then also have a position at another institution.” When most universities are aware of such dual appointments, it is reported in an annual conflict of interest. But Phelps said very few institutions actually analyze those for potential risks.

Texas Scorecard asked UTS and UT Southwestern for comment. UTS did not respond. UT Southwestern did.

“Dr. Li’s faculty appointment ended Aug. 31, 2023, prior to acceptance and publication of the paper,” it replied. “UTSW requires outside employment to be reported. The Chinese Institutes for Medical Research, Beijing (CIMR) was announced November 2023 after Dr. Li had left UTSW.” UTSW also provided a link to its conflict of interest policies.

“UT Southwestern Medical Center takes seriously protocols to protect our research and complies with all federal and state requirements regarding these protections,” UT Southwestern wrote. “Neither Tsinghua University nor Zhejiang University are on the U.S. Department of Commerce ‘entity’ or ‘unverified’ lists that identify institutions of concern to the U.S. government, which includes institutions confirmed as operating in a manner contrary to U.S. interests. UT Southwestern does not collaborate with institutions on the Department of Commerce’s entity or unverified lists.”

UT Southwestern also commented about its internal security measures. “Additionally, UT Southwestern has multilayered protections and reviews that occur before and after engaging in agreements or collaborations.” UT Southwestern’s full replies are printed near the end of this article.

The data IPTalons provided was based on open-source searches of publication information—in other words, research papers. Phelps noted this analysis was done without any interaction with CPRIT staff. IPTalons only looked at foreign research collaborations, not other indicators like ownership, patent portfolios, business registrations, nor did it review research institutions or private enterprises linked with each CPRIT scholar.

“We have not looked at the entire CPRIT research portfolio; however, based on a sample of 100 CPRIT-funded researchers, there is a pattern of foreign influence,” Phelps wrote.

State Rep. Tony Tinderholt (R–Arlington), a U.S. military veteran, is familiar with infiltration and espionage efforts. He opposes these types of research collaborations. “If we want to protect our nation, our secrets, our technology, our advances in weaponry, viruses … why on earth would we share it and participate with adversarial nations and people from those countries? I don’t get it,” he said.

Phelps believes funders like CPRIT bear some responsibility for protecting research from countries of concern. He reported CPRIT has awarded more than 2,000 grants for product development, cancer prevention, and research. These totaled roughly $3.6 billion to 143 non-profits, private enterprises, and academic institutions in Texas. “They never ask who your collaborators are,” he said. “They should.” Phelps also said CPRIT should ask institutions about their sources for current and pending financial support.

CPRIT responded to Texas Scorecard’s questions regarding the IPTalons analysis. Its full response is printed at the end of this article. “The researcher referred to in your email, Dr. Liya Gu, is not a CPRIT Scholar and has not served as a principal investigator on a project receiving CPRIT grant funds,” CPRIT wrote. “CPRIT notes that only Texas-based entities – not individuals – are eligible to receive CPRIT grants, including CPRIT Scholar recruitment grants.”

Allen Phelps agreed with CPRIT about Gu. IPTalons’ analysis showed CPRIT hadn’t funded Gu since 2021. But Phelps said CPRIT has directly funded Guo Min-Li. After follow-up questioning, CPRIT referred us back to its original response.

In its original response, CPRIT wrote it does “not have the investigatory authority to independently discover an employee’s relationship that he or she did not disclose to the grantee institution.” Additionally, it “rel[ies] upon the grantee institution to comply with all federal and state laws, administrative rules, regulations, and policies regarding such collaborations and receipt of funds.”

But just following federal rules may not be enough. Phelps noted the National Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation follow the rules CPRIT pointed to. It doesn’t ask who a researcher’s collaborators are, either. “NIH and NSF, their defense is ‘but we didn’t fund that guy. We funded the guy in the US,’” Phelps said. “That’s why the institutions are on the hook for their researchers’ behaviors, because the institution certifies that the researcher, the PI [principal investigator], has met all the obligations.”

Cancer Research?

Why would a hostile power, like the CCP, target cancer research?

According to Phelps, it would be for the intellectual property rights. By collaborating on the cure for cancer, Phelps believes the CCP could claim it owns it. “If two people from different companies or different universities are working on something without a formal agreement between the companies or the universities, who actually owns that intellectual property right?” he asked.

If the CCP would own the rights to the cure for cancer, that would make America dependent on them for the supply. That’s risky. “China will turn off our supply chain at any moment right when they feel like there’s not enough penicillin or antibiotics for their own use,” Phelps said. “We saw it during COVID.”

Though COVID is over, we’re still vulnerable to such threats, according to State Sen. Bob Hall (R–Edgewood). “We are so dependent on other nations for critical products, particularly in medicines,” he said. “We have been set up so that we are in a very, very vulnerable position from a geopolitical standpoint.”

CPRIT replied to our questions on such a risk. It wrote that a research contract with them “requires the grantee institution to protect intellectual property rights and to notify CPRIT of any agreements that could impact ownership of the CPRIT-funded research outcomes.”

Raiding the Supply Chain and “Humpty Dumpty”

Infiltrating cancer research is part of a pattern in a much larger game—and supplanting America as a global power is the prize.

As Phelps explained earlier, much of the development of American technology, including military technology, occurs in our universities.

The process by which technology is developed in America looks like a supply chain. It is birthed at the top of the chain as basic fundamental research. As time passes and academics work on an idea, what started as basic, in time, can be developed to the point where it may become a classified national security project. Washington, D.C., wasn’t aware of this at first.

“What the Department of Defense discovered was that their classified projects were simply just an aggregation of a bunch of unclassified programs,” Phelps said. He called this a “humpty dumpty” approach to innovation. Seemingly unrelated parts are put together as they develop, and a radical new technology, with potential military application, appears.

It turned out the early part of the development process was easy to infiltrate. Hostile nations discovered this. They went hard after the early stages of the research conception process.

“The blindness that we had in our supply chain was pretty startling. We realized that a lot of our advanced technologies were being exploited very early on,” Phelps said. “Countries of concern, like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, recognized that the earlier they could get into the supply chain, the easier it was to take the technology.”

America is widely regarded as having the globe’s most powerful military. A vulnerability like this could cost us this spot. “These hostile nations put those things together, and it allows them to create these weapon systems and these things before we get to it,” Tinderholt warned.

The U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee gave a similar caution. In February 2020, it published a report about Chinese Communist Party infiltration efforts in American higher education. The committee referred to it as the “Thousand Talent Plan.” Committee members stated the CCP had recruited “thousands of Chinese researchers and scientists.” For what purpose? “To focus on cutting-edge technology in foreign universities.”

The CCP would do this by accessing “non-public fundamental research” in higher education. This, the committee warned, “can be used to supercharge Chinese innovation at U.S. taxpayers’ expense.”

Guarding the Hen House

Academia may be one of the biggest opponents to securing higher education research from infiltration.

In response to the infiltration threat, the federal government created a new classification for basic fundamental research: controlled unclassified information (CUI). Phelps said anything identified as CUI had security measures slapped onto it. These include advanced cyber security and limiting work access to native-born American citizens.

Academia didn’t care for this. “The problem that we’re facing in the United States is that researchers that have signed up for basic fundamental research now are kind of kicking and screaming that they have to have rules,” Phelps said. “There’s a clash of cultures occurring here in the United States.”

Yet security is what they are supposed to do. Phelps said researchers awarded taxpayer-funded federal and state agency grants, like CPRIT, must follow the guidelines of NSPM-33—the January 2022 National Security Presidential Memorandum from the Biden–Harris administration. Guidance on this memo worked to provide “clear and effective rules for ensuring research security and researcher responsibilities.”

There also appears to be a financial incentive motivating academics to resist security efforts. In April 2023, Dr. Charles Lieber, the former chair of Harvard University’s Chemistry and Chemical Biology Department, was federally sentenced for false statements regarding his association with the Wuhan University of Technology (WUT) and China’s Thousand Talents Program.

“He forgot to pay taxes on the money that China gave him,” Phelps said. “He was prosecuted on tax evasion, not because he shared super cool stuff with China, although he should have been.”

Phelps said Lieber’s case is not an outlier. American faculty double-dip for their research projects regularly. Not only do they receive a grant from an organization like CPRIT for research, but if they collaborate with someone from a foreign country, like China, then they’ll also receive funding from that nation.

”I suspect nearly everyone in this racket has not filled out a 1099 [tax form], and paid taxes on the money that they got,” Phelps said. “Collectively, just in the state of Texas, it’s probably billions of dollars that have come in from China, and Russia, and Iran that we may or may not know where the money went.”

Phelps was quick to say there are Texas universities with some type of research security. He praised Texas A&M as having “a good program.” But even those running security need help and accountability. “The issue is that the problem is so big, in a lot of these cases, a lot of these institutions, they’re just outgunned,” Phelps said. “There’s simply not enough effort or resources going against, literally, the government of China.”

Phelps also isn’t certain all university boards of regents have been briefed about the seriousness of the situation. “I think [University of Texas] has been briefed, and I’m pretty sure Texas A&M has briefed their board,” he said. “Outside of those two systems. I’m not sure if board[s] of regents are even aware of this risk.”

Neither UT, the Texas A&M University System, or Texas Tech responded when asked if their boards had been briefed on this threat. Boards of regents are appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state senate.

Accountability in research security is lacking. This is an area with desperate need of it, considering the hostile powers raiding American research. Just trusting academics to do it without verifying their efforts is unwise. “A lot of schools are hiring academics to be in charge of research security, and their primary mission is not to make their buddies mad,” Phelps said. “Research security is a serious business. It takes people that actually have either an intelligence background or, at a minimum, some sort of security or risk management background.”

For his part, Tinderholt doesn’t have much faith in university administration or faculty. “I’m not saying that they’re bad actors, but I’m saying I have zero faith that they are not,” he said.

Texas Solutions

Phelps said it’s hard to push security reform through Washington, D.C. But Texas can, and should, act quickly. Already, the Lone Star State has begun spinning up its defenses.

The week of November 19, Gov. Greg Abbott issued a slew of executive orders to guard against the CCP. One “prohibit[s] higher education faculty and employees from participating in any foreign recruitment program from a foreign adversary nation.”

Phelps applauded this. “It’s a very good step,” he said. But there’s more to do.

First, consider the source of research grants–in this example, CPRIT.

“There seems to be a missing accountability element in the current process, but it seems logical that CPRIT will become the gatekeeper,” Phelps wrote. “Before research grants fund a health-related research project, researchers must disclose, and CPRIT must review, assess, and approve, any foreign research collaboration or foreign sources of funding that may put research assets at risk.”

In its response, CPRIT wrote that it requires a “grantee institution to certify its compliance with contractual requirements, including its compliance with all federal and state laws.” However, it admitted it ​​doesn’t “have the investigatory authority to independently discover an employee’s relationship that he or she did not disclose to the grantee institution.”

That’s just for starters. Phelps recommended requiring stage agencies like CPRIT to have prospective researchers disclose any foreign research affiliations when applying for grants. Before delivering funding, state agencies should also “conduct due diligence” and confirm grant winners don’t have “undisclosed relationships.”

These agencies should also be required to have institutions and research universities certify they have no conflicts of interest. In its response, CPRIT wrote its “grant contract requires the grantee institution to comply with federal rules against researcher conflicts of interest.”

Phelps also believes every research security program should be subject to a state-level audit. “Show me what is in place to prevent an individual faculty member from working with the People’s Liberation Army or the Republic of Iran’s Republican Guard,” he said. “Is there a safety net here that would prevent that from happening?”

Tinderholt thinks such an audit should go further. “Add to that how many adversarial nation citizens are involved in that school or in the research that that professor is involved in,” he said. Tinderholt also doesn’t believe students from hostile nations should be allowed to study at Texas universities. “Why are we allowing, for instance, Chinese nationals to come and be a part of that type of research?”

What about researchers double-dipping? Phelps believes there should be reporting requirements for any monies higher education researchers receive.

Tinderholt wants the practice outlawed. “It should be illegal. Like a police officer, if they’re going to do additional employment, they have to get permission to do additional employment off duty,” he said. “These professors should have to report that they make additional funds from research that’s happening, but we should certainly make it illegal, felony level, illegal, to collect funds, either directly or indirectly, from adversarial nations.”

As reported earlier, Gov. Abbott has acted to protect Texas from the CCP. But Phelps pointed out more steps remain to secure research in higher education. “The state of Texas is under attack by a nation-state,” he said.

The stakes are high.

UT Southwestern Response

December 14, 2024 response:
UT Southwestern Medical Center takes seriously protocols to protect our research and complies with all federal and state requirements regarding these protections.

Neither Tsinghua University nor Zhejiang University are on the U.S. Department of Commerce “entity” or “unverified” lists that identify institutions of concern to the U.S. government, which includes institutions confirmed as operating in a manner contrary to U.S. interests. UT Southwestern does not collaborate with institutions on the Department of Commerce’s entity or unverified lists.

Additionally, UT Southwestern has multilayered protections and reviews that occur before and after engaging in agreements or collaborations. These include screening protocols for foreign entities disclosed, for shipments to prohibited destinations and parties, and for published research. UT Southwestern reviews its interactions in conjunction with lists of prohibited individuals and entities maintained by federal, state, and international agencies. These include those listed by the National Defense Authorization Act, Departments of Defense, State, and Treasury, as well as law enforcements agencies including the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, and Interpol, as well as others.

Jan. 1st 2025 response:
1. Is Guo-Min Li still employed by UT Southwestern?
No. Dr. Li’s faculty appointment ended Aug. 31, 2023, prior to acceptance and publication of the paper.

2. What requirements does UT Southwestern have for all employees to report double employment, or prior employment, with foreign interest groups with ties to countries of concern?
UTSW requires outside employment to be reported. The Chinese Institutes for Medical Research, Beijing (CIMR) was announced November 2023 after Dr. Li had left UTSW.

3. Does UT Southwestern maintain annual conflicts of interest reports regarding its staff?
UTSW Conflict of Interest Policies are here.

CPRIT Response

December 14, 2024 response:
NOTE: the researcher referred to in your email, Dr. Liya Gu, is not a CPRIT Scholar and has not served as a principal investigator on a project receiving CPRIT grant funds.

For context regarding our response, CPRIT notes that only Texas- based entities – not individuals – are eligible to receive CPRIT grants, including CPRIT Scholar recruitment grants.

What is CPRIT’s policy regarding collaborations with foreign countries, including Iran, North Korea, Russia, and China? What does CPRIT do to block such collaborations?

Any proposed collaboration that violates federal or state law is prohibited, serves as
grounds for contract termination, and subjects the institution to repayment.

CPRIT’s contract requires that neither the principal investigator nor any personnel are declared ineligible or otherwise excluded from participation in the project by any federal or state department or agency. CPRIT requires the contracting institution to certify that it complies with federal rules against misconduct in science, including academic dishonesty, and research conflicts of interest. The grantee must promptly report issues to CPRIT.

CPRIT prohibits grantee institutions from using CPRIT grant funds to pay for expenses incurred by out-of-state or international collaborators. Grantees must seek pre-approval from CPRIT for any international travel paid for with grant funds.

CPRIT’s contract requires the grantee institution to protect intellectual property rights and to notify CPRIT of any agreements that could impact ownership of the CPRIT-funded research outcomes.

Does CPRIT review, assess, and approve any foreign research collaborations or foreign sources of funding?

CPRIT grant funds only reimburse in-state collaboration expenses. We rely upon the grantee institution to comply with all federal and state laws, administrative rules, regulations, and policies regarding such collaborations and receipt of funds.

Does CPRIT require prospective researchers to disclose foreign research affiliations? Does CPRIT confirm that grantees do not have undisclosed relationships?

CPRIT requires the grantee institution to certify its compliance with contractual requirements, including its compliance with all federal and state laws. CPRIT does not have the investigatory authority to independently discover an employee’s relationship that he or she did not disclose to the grantee institution. Grantee institutions review, assess, and approve foreign research affiliations of their personnel working on CPRIT-funded projects and to disclose such affiliations to the extent that they constitute a conflict of interest or commitment.

Does CPRIT require institutions and research universities they consider to fund with grants to certify they have no conflicts of interest?

CPRIT’s grant contract requires the grantee institution to comply with federal rules against researcher conflicts of interest.

January 2, 2025 response:
You may refer back to our original response submitted to you on December 14th.