Specialists state Texans remain vulnerable to hostile powers buying land in their state. The road to addressing this may not be easy.
Concern about hostile powers buying up land in Texas has escalated for the past few years. It started when it was widely reported that a retired Chinese general—Sun Guangxin—had bought roughly seven percent of the land in South Texas. Guangxin had planned to build a wind farm on the part of his land near a U.S. military installation. National security specialist, Kyle Bass, cautioned this project would allow for espionage activities.
China, under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), was identified by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as a threat to national security in its 2024 Annual Threat Assessment.
State lawmakers passed the Lone Star Infrastructure Protection Act in 2021 to address the problem of Chinese land grabs. While the House committee’s interim report praised the law, the Daily Mail reported in September 2023 that Guangxin still owns vast tracts of land in Val Verde, though he intended to sell it. At the time of publication, they found Guangxin sold “most” of his land for the planned wind farm, but others allege he kept an interest in the property.
In 2023, State Sen. Lois Kolkhorst (R–Brenham) proposed a stronger measure. However, Speaker Dade Phelan (R-Beaumont) killed the proposal shortly afterward in the Texas House.
Kolkhorst has proposed this measure again for the 2025 legislative session, and it’s one of her top three priorities. It is filed as Senate Bill 307. “Why would we ever let foreign adversaries encroach on our military bases, harvest our natural resources like oil, gas, timber, and rare earth materials, or own our farmland?” Kolkhorst stated. “SB 307 is a common-sense approach to national security. We should all agree that ownership of these assets by foreign entities presents a multitude of potential threats, from resource manipulation to control over strategic industries.”
The current systems tracking land ownership may make it difficult to screen out bad actors representing hostile powers from buying up land in the state.
Gerald Klassen, a research data scientist at Texas A&M’s Texas Real Estate Research Center, argued as much to the Texas House Committee on Securing Texas from Hostile Foreign Organizations. The committee’s interim report was published in December 2024.
“Ownership records, primarily held in county registries, only contain names and addresses, often with inconsistent formatting or misspellings,” Klassen testified. “There is no reliable method to determine an owner’s county of origin, immigration status, or corporate affiliations, complicating efforts to enforce foreign property ownership restrictions.”
The federal government is not much help here either. That’s according to attorney Kenneth Nunnenkamp—a specialist on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).
Under the U.S. Department of Treasury, CFIUS is “authorized to review certain transactions involving foreign investment in the United States and certain real estate transactions by foreign persons.” They do this to assess national security threats from such purchases.
Nunnenkamp testified that CFIUS doesn’t review every purchase. They focus on “specific cases that impact critical infrastructure and sensitive technologies.” Furthermore, he said that CFIUS oversight is “voluntary and does not typically apply to real estate, except in cases involving critical infrastructure or technologies.”
Nunnenkamp also complained about how CFIUS makes decisions. “Citing examples of sanctioned Russian nationals holding U.S. agricultural land, Mr. Nunnenkamp highlighted the need for transparency in CFIUS’s decision-making process, which he described as a ‘black box,’” the interim report read. “This secrecy limits states’ understanding of when they can enforce independent restrictions. He suggested the possibility of Congress expanding CFIUS’s authority to address economic security concerns at both the state and federal levels.”
Open Threat
As geopolitical tensions rise, Texas has become an important target of America’s enemies. Illegal aliens from China, Russia, and Iran have already been found to have crossed Texas’ southern border. DNI’s 2024 Annual Threat Assessment identified all of the above countries as national security threats.
Blocking property purchases from hostile nations has also become an important part of border security, Chuck DeVore of the Texas Public Policy Foundation testified.
“In his testimony, Chuck DeVore highlighted the increasing acquisition of U.S. real estate by Chinese nationals and corporations, citing strategic motivations and potential national security concerns. Mr. DeVore noted that Chinese interest in U.S. property surged by 2015, with America as the top destination for these investments,” read the interim report. “Between 2020 and 2022, Chinese-led entities increased their foreign land transactions, with notable land holdings in Texas, North Carolina, and Missouri.”
DeVore gave three primary motivations for why the CCP would make such purchases: food security for China, access to intellectual property rights, and espionage opportunities.
“The strategic location of some Chinese-owned U.S. properties near military installations raises concerns about espionage, surveillance, and even potential electronic interference,” the report continued, citing DeVore.
China’s 2017 “National Intelligence Law” is also relevant. DeVore explained this law “mandates cooperation from Chinese citizens and companies in intelligence activities, increasing potential security threats from Chinese-owned U.S. land.”
Possible Solutions
National security questions have usually been thought of as federal problems. However, Nunnenkamp told committee members that there is space for Texas to act “when no constitutional law governs the area, specifically in relation to economic security and land purchases.”
DeVore urged state lawmakers to take action to “address risks posed by foreign land ownership near sensitive U.S. sites.” He pointed to recent warnings from the FBI about the CCP’s covert intelligence operations in America.
Kolkhorst pointed out that Texans have demanded action too. “During the 2024 primary election, over 95% of the Republican voters approved of the policy to prohibit ownership of land and natural resources by entities and agents of adversarial,” she stated.
She pushed her proposed measure for this session as a necessary step. “The importance of SB 307 extends far beyond state boundaries as a matter of national security. Allowing adversarial nations like China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia to own land and natural resources in Texas poses significant risks as our state is home to strategic military bases and abundant natural resources, and Texas is one of the top-producing agriculture states for America,” she stated. “These nations have shown a willingness to act against U.S. interests, and increased foreign ownership can create vulnerabilities that adversaries might exploit … Enacting SB 307 reinforces our commitment to protecting Texas land and sends a clear message that we will not tolerate risks that jeopardize our national security.”
Considering the threats hostile powers pose to Texas, the deficits in land ownership tracking are troubling. Klassen compared Texas’ deeds registration system with that used in Australia, Canada, and Japan.
Those countries use what’s called the Torrens Title system. Klassen testified that with Torrens:
- Governments act as custodians of all property titles and oversee title transfers.
- Identification of buyers and sellers is required during transactions, enabling governments to regulate foreign ownership more effectively.
Klassen testified that the American system is easier for hostile powers to exploit surreptitiously.
“In contrast, the United States deeds system allows title transfers to occur through private contracts with minimal government involvement,” emphasized the interim report. “The structure presents obstacles for establishing and enforcing foreign ownership laws, potentially leading to delays and legal complexities.”
Klassen further advised that to improve transparency, identification should be required from sellers and buyers, in line with requirements mandated by the controversial U.S. Patriot Act.
A centralized data depository, Klassen continued, “could” help law enforcement by following “indirect ownership interests and activities by foreign organizations.” He pointed to British Colombia’s Land Ownership Transparency Registry as an example.
“Integrating such a registry with existing property databases would offer stronger monitoring capabilities,” read the report.
Meanwhile, the threat of hostile powers owning Texas land remains. The Daily Mail reported in September 2023 that the CCP owns a stake in more than 380,000 acres of American land. Guangxin owned 34 percent of that.
“Protect Texas Land” is one of the recommendations of the House committee in their interim report. “Texas should act to prohibit hostile foreign actors, who intend to do us harm, from owning land in the state. This prohibition should extend to hostile foreign governments, entities controlled by hostile foreign governments, and persons living in countries with hostile foreign governments,” concluded the interim report. “The legislature may consider prioritizing agricultural land, land adjacent to or within close proximity to military installations, and land adjacent to or within close proximity to critical infrastructure.”
Committee members wrote that “the rights of American citizens and lawful permanent residents” shouldn’t be violated and proposed defense measures “should be made in good faith without regard to a person’s immutable characteristics.”
For Kolkhorst, inaction is not an option. “It’s crucial we act decisively to prevent further encroachment and ensure that our natural resources remain under the control of those who prioritize the safety and prosperity of our country,” she wrote Texas Scorecard.
The committee’s interim report covered multiple theaters in Texas under threat. These will be explored in future articles.
